Putin Can’t Stop Now — and Trump Doesn’t Get It: Interview with Dr Stephen Blank

Does Donald Trump understand what European security really means – and is he aware of the true interests of the United States? American analyst Dr. Stephen Blank casts serious doubt on the competence of Donald Trump and his team.

In this exclusive interview on Channel 24, we discussed with the expert the deeper flaws in Trump's policy toward Ukraine and Europe – why it lacks strategy and rationality, why defeating Russia is critical for the world, how Russia still manages to wage full-scale war, and what a new European order might look like once the war ends.

Stephen Blank is a former CIA consultant, former professor at the U.S. Army War College, senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Atlantic Council, and an expert in Russian foreign policy, Eurasian security, and international relations.

Trump doesn't seek to isolate the United States — but that's exactly where he's pushing it

With Donald Trump returning to the White House, US Foreign policy seems like turn another direction, change in direction. Do you think it's going only to the isolation of the US from the other world, or is this like more strategic rethinking of American global role?

Well, I would reject actually both alternatives. I don't think it's intended to be isolation. I think it's intended to be complete independence. But the result will be isolation because it is completely unstrategic. There is no strategy.

If you look closely at the totality of Donald Trump's foreign policy, there is no strategic thinking. There is rather a kind of vision, but it's mainly impulse, ego, and a lack of any kind of policy process that I can discern. So it is fundamentally unstrategic. And the result is, as a result of that, we are isolating ourselves not by intention, but by consequence.

Do you mean political isolation, or economic as well?

Both. Economically, the tariff policy is erratic — today there's a tariff, tomorrow there isn't, and rates fluctuate without any strategic rationale.

For instance, if the goal is to pressure NATO allies into spending more on defense, you can't impose 50–100 percent tariffs on European goods shipped to the U.S. Those tariffs undermine European defense industries, since European defense spending today relies heavily on U.S. orders. If Europe can't sell goods to the U.S., they can't build the weapons they need. That's the kind of thoughtlessness we see.

Politically, look at Ukraine and Europe: The Wall Street Journal recently pointed out that Donald Trump must be the only person on the planet who does not understand that what Vladimir Putin wants in Ukraine. Putin has been explicit for years about his aims in Ukraine, yet this administration acts as if giving him "two more weeks" to clarify his intentions is reasonable. There's no strategy — only impulse, emotion, and narcissism, plus a few bad ideas. There's no understanding of European security.

Some of Trump supporters argue that this rhetoric has forced Europeans to take more responsibility for their own defense. If that's true, then maybe it works — say, even 1 percent of the time?

The rhetoric has had an impact. It comes on top of a process that had already begun by Europe, although not fast enough to spend more money on defense. But it's not just a question of spending more money. If you want to defend Europe, you need a unified command-and-control structure – one European command, not a German, French, or British one.

Right now, there is no European command outside NATO; if you remove the U.S. from NATO, that structure collapses.

• Yes, Europe is increasing its defense budget, and more aid is flowing to Ukraine.
• Denmark is even paying Ukraine to build weapons — recognizing how innovative Ukraine's defense industry has become.
• Germany is committing a brigade to Lithuania and boosting its defense spending.

But you can't just snap your fingers and get this kind of result. And it needs to be done in a considered way. And that's the antithesis of the way the Trump administration works. It's all impulse, emotion and show. It's not substance and it's not strategy.

You mean the flips from calling Putin "crazy" one day to "let's give him two more weeks" the next?

Exactly. It's a perfect example of a president who doesn't know what he wants or how to achieve it, and who has no understanding or desire to understand what European security is all about and certainly has no concept of what Vladimir Putin and Russia are all about.

Sanctions against Russia, NATO expansion, and the Middle East

Could Congress act more independently of Trump on Ukraine? For instance, Senator Lindsey Graham introduced a sanctions bill imposing 500 percent tariffs on Russian energy sector.

Graham's bill now has 82 senators behind it, and he's aiming for a unanimous 100. The Senate could pass that resolution and even authorize funding for Ukraine and the sanctions. But Trump would have to sign it. If he vetoes, Congress needs a two-thirds majority — 67 votes — to override. That takes time.

So the real problem isn't Congress but Trump himself. He's demonstrated he can't guide U.S. foreign policy and lacks any real understanding of U.S. interests. His administration seems full of people who are, frankly, incompetent. Rubio, for example, has reversed all his Senate positions as Secretary of State, and they've sharply reduced National Security Council staff.

This is not to say that everything was wonderful before that, but cutting your head off because you're unhappy with the last result isn't a policy process. The problem is a president who can't articulate strategic interests in Europe — or anywhere else, but also of devising a policy process that would allow the United States to get whatever he wants. He's making it up as it goes along. I used to teach in Texas and there's a phrase in Texas about somebody like this that he's "all hat and no cattle".

A few days ago, Keith Kellogg said the U.S. might halt NATO expansion. Does that mean Ukraine's path to NATO is off the table, perhaps indefinitely?

Trump has often said he opposes Ukraine's NATO membership. You could argue that made sense before 2014 and the annexation of Crimea, but since Russia invaded in 2022, that position is obsolete. The only way to secure Ukraine and Europe is to bring Ukraine into NATO. Russia might claim NATO expansion is a threat, but that's nonsense. It's a threat only to Putin's autocracy, because it ends any hope of a restored Russian Empire. There is no concept of European security that is compatible with the Russian Empire. And what's more, the Russian people pay the price for this — a million killed, missing in action and wounded, plus all the economic stagnation that we are now seeing in Russia.

One more, Russia cannot win this war. That's clear, except to Vladimir Putin and his team. They think they can do so no matter what the costs. Without Ukraine in NATO, Russia will perpetuate a permanent state of war with Europe and beyond, because Putin envisions a global empire. He wants two things: to restore the Russian Empire and to force the U.S. to treat Russia as an equal — like in the Cold War.

That can't happen: Russia depends on China and is already subordinate to it. And the Russian government's resources cannot create any positive order anywhere else in the world. They can disrupt, but they cannot build. Not under Putin.

Well, in Soviet history, the Menshevik Martov accused Lenin of creating a state of siege in Russian social democracy over a hundred years ago. Russia wants to create a permanent state of siege in world politics. And that's unacceptable, not just to the United States, but to a whole number of other states. And that means perpetual war all over the world, not just Europe, but also Africa, Middle East, Korea, China.

Have the Russians started facing problems in the Middle East after the fall of Bashar Assad?

The Middle East had been making some progress until Hamas attacked Israel in 2023—a response to feeling sidelined and to Iranian backing. Some suspect Russia was aware of Hamas's plans, but there's no definitive proof. True progress would require ending that war: defeating Hamas and Iran's terrorist sponsorship, plus halting Iranian nuclear ambitions. Iran would have to change policy.

Key regional states — Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Syria's new government, Egypt, and Gulf states — don't want war with Israel. But you have to defeat Hamas and you have to defeat Iran, and you have to prevent nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. But as long as Russia depends on Iran, there's no incentive for Moscow to end hostilities. Russia supplies the Houthis with weapons and intelligence. In return, Iran supports Russia politically and militarily.

So what you have as a result of the war in Ukraine is a global. A series of global consequences. Middle east is one example. We could go on and talk about other, but that's why the Ukraine has to win. It's to end the state of war that Russia wants to perpetuate across the globe.

What awaits Ukraine and Europe after the war?

If Ukraine loses, what will be the global consequences?

Thus, Russia's war in Ukraine ripples globally. If Ukraine fails, we risk a worldwide confrontation between Russia, China, and the U.S. If Ukraine wins — restoring its territorial integrity and eventually joining NATO and the EU — Russia becomes far less dangerous.

Putin would still be in power, so war crimes trials and reparations are unlikely, but a Ukrainian victory would send a powerful message to China, Iran, and North Korea.

Some say we're entering a second Cold War. Could we also see a new global arms race?

Before, it was the U.S. vs. the Soviet Union; now it's the U.S. vs. China, with Russia aligned to China. That label is an attempt to avoid thinking seriously about the problem. It's a search for a label. Just put a label on the problem and then we know what it is and then we, you know, we don't have to think about it anymore. So I don't like that term. I understand why it's being used and where it comes from, but I don't like it.

As for an arms race, that's been under way for at least a decade. Russia's nuclear revival really began in 2004. Twenty years ago, when you had the election between Yushchenko and Yanukovych, that Russia tried to subvert the Ukrainian government and failed and they blamed it on the West. The annexation of Crimea was a first step, and now Ukraine is another stage.

If you look at SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) data on defense spending and nuclear arsenals, you'll see this trend long predates 2022.

Can Ukraine become a long-term strategic ally of the United States, similar to Israel, South Korea, or even West Germany?

Ukraine is not West Germany. Germany is a full NATO ally, bound by Article 5, and we have a solemn obligation to its defense. The only time Article 5 was invoked was after September 11, when NATO united behind us.

Israel's relationship with the U.S. is unique, built over 75 years, especially since 1973. I've advised Ukrainians to emulate that relationship, but they haven't succeeded yet.

In Southeast Asia, the U.S. has a defense treaty only with the Philippines—once an American colony and still home to strategic bases.

Ukraine's status is unique.

That said, it does not take a PhD to figure out that the security of Europe is bound up with the security of Ukraine. And we get back here to the original point that Donald Trump, certainly no PhD, seems to have no idea what European security is all about. And as a result, he has no idea what he wants or how to get it. And Putin complete consistently plays him for a fool as a result.

He keeps saying he's not interested in European security.

Well, that's well and good if you want to be a real estate magnet in Florida, if you want to be president of the United States, you now have taken upon yourself the responsibility of defending American interests. And American interests include the fact that we fought two world wars to secure Europe and a Cold War which began in Europe for the most part.

And what we have now is a Russian attempt to overthrow the solutions that were arrived at by international treaty in the 1980s and 90s and returned the world back to the Cold War situation.

If you don't understand that preventing this is a vital interest of the United States, especially when we have 80,000 troops stationed in Europe — then you're in the wrong job. And I don't mean that in a partisan way. It applies to anyone. If you fail to see that European security is in the vital interest of the United States, you have no business being in the White House.

You also mentioned that Europeans have already invested in Ukraine's defense industry. Do you think the U.S. might follow suit, or is Trump solely focused on bringing production back to the United States?

Honestly, it's hard to say. There's really no way to know the answer to that. I do think it would be in the mutual interest of both the United States and Ukraine to cooperate with Ukraine's defense industry — especially to learn from the lessons they've gained during this war. Those lessons will be crucial for any future contingencies.

But I don't expect this administration to pursue that. They don't seem to know what they want or how to achieve it. And they clearly don't grasp that Vladimir Putin cannot be bargained with. What he wants is, to use a big word, incommensurate with any notion of American or European security. He wants to rebuild a Russian Empire and restore Russia's status to what the Soviet Union had during the Cold War. That's not a foundation for any kind of order, let alone peace.

Trump’s plan to split Russia and China is doomed

When Donald Trump talks about trying to separate Russia and China, is that even a realistic goal?

No — in plain English, no. This is part of the delusion that Trump can somehow repeat what Kissinger and Nixon did 50 years ago, and that he'll win a Nobel Peace Prize for ending the war in Ukraine. It's pure fantasy. That's the problem — we're not thinking rationally, in cold, hard geopolitical terms.

As The Economist and many other analysts have pointed out — and I've written extensively on Russia and China myself — Russia is now completely dependent on China to sustain its war effort.

Some say Putin just wants a seat at the Western table — and misses the days of dining with U.S. presidents. How important is that kind of recognition to him personally?

For Putin personally, it's important that Russia regain the status the Soviet Union once held. But that's not going to happen — Europe will not accept it, and that much is clear.

Second, he cannot afford to break with China. Without Chinese support, Russia would not be able to sustain its war effort — period. This is confirmed by testimony from the U.S. – China Economic and Security Review Commission, available on their website. China is Russia's main supplier of semiconductors, ball bearings, and other essential components, without which the war effort would grind to a halt. The yuan has become Russia's primary foreign currency. The Russian economy now depends heavily on trade with China and on China's purchases of Russian energy.

Russia is also unable to prevent China from expanding its economic influence in Central Asia and now in the Caucasus. It is receiving military technology from China — whereas 15 or 20 years ago, the flow went in the opposite direction.

In ideological terms, the two countries are closely aligned. They share a similar worldview and a common approach to security — what might be called a holistic view. Both are united in their opposition to U.S. policy and in their belief that America is weakening while they are gaining strength. They believe this is their opportunity. Military cooperation between Russia and China continues to grow stronger each year.

So the idea of separating them is a fantasy. And that's part of the problem — we are dealing with a government that is operating on the basis of fantasy, lack of information, no strategic thinking and ego.

Another key tactic for Putin is simply to wait. He counts on democratically elected governments that he doesn't like being voted out of office over time.

But it's not just about waiting. Russia is actively working to undermine democratic elections. We've seen clear interference in the U.S. in 2016, 2018, and 2020. There's also documented evidence of Russian involvement across the Balkans — in Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova — and ongoing interference in Serbian politics. They have significant influence over Slovakia and Hungary, and they've recently been caught trying to meddle in Poland's elections, which are happening right now.

Russia is also financially supporting political parties in Western Europe, including "Alternative für Deutschland" in Germany and Marine Le Pen's "National Rally" in France. It's very likely they played a role in backing Brexit nine years ago.

Beyond that, they are involved in criminal activity across Europe. They're not passively waiting for governments they dislike to be voted out—they are actively working to destabilize democratic systems across the continent. In effect, they are waging a political and informational war throughout Europe.

Peace Talks, the End of War, and the Kremlin’s Ultimatums

But if Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin reach some kind of agreement on Ukraine, and Trump simply asks his "friend" Vladimir to pause the war until he leaves the White House and then resume it afterward—how realistic is that possibility?

Well, theoretically, an agreement is possible, but it would have to come at the cost of Ukraine and despite strong objections from Europe. What we've seen is that Putin wants everything. Nothing is ever enough for him.

He cannot stop without claiming a victory, both for domestic reasons and because if the war ends without Ukraine becoming part of Russia — not just the four regions he believes he's entitled to — he would have undermined his own position at home.

He is like a Shakespearean character — like Macbeth or Richard III. For example, Richard III says something like, "I am in so deep with sin that one sin leads to another". Macbeth says, "I am so steeped in blood that going forward or turning back is equally exhausting". Putin is in a similar situation — he can't stop now.

We also remember his first ultimatum — he demanded NATO leave the Baltics and all countries that joined NATO after 1997

Yeah, it's ridiculous. It's not going to happen, but it shows that he wants his empire back. He's driven by this idea. He believes God has ordained him to be the new face of Russian "Sobornost" — or the regatherer of Russian lands. But Russia can't sustain an empire anymore. Trying to hold onto an empire means permanent war in Europe. That's my point. Russia can no longer maintain an empire except at the cost of constant warfare. And Russia can't afford that. Without China, they've already lost.

Putin has also tested the European security system through this war. The question is whether there's an opportunity to rethink the entire European security system or the West will simply try to fix the old one?

Well, that depends on how this war ends. But let's be honest — there has been a lot of criticism of NATO enlargement in the '90s. Russia's idea at the time was that the United States and Russia should dominate Europe together. That was unacceptable to everyone else.

Those who criticized NATO expansion often ignored what Russia was actually proposing: essentially a Russo-American control over Europe. This was unacceptable both to the rest of Europe and to the United States — and also unsustainable, because the resources simply aren't there.

If Russia loses this war — and I've described what a Ukrainian victory might look like — then the Russian government that follows Putin, or comes after the current regime, might realize that Russia can no longer be an empire beyond its own borders. If it then gradually reconciles with Europe and returns to European civilization — which, after all, Russia is part of — there could be a possibility for a new European order.

But that process will take several years.

They also say they have their own, unique way, but no one can really explain what that means

These ideas go back to the 17th and 18th centuries. When I was in graduate school, I studied this—it's called Slavophilism. It's the conservative belief that Russia has its own unique civilization.

Just look at how many people in Russia are religious. But the church is really just an instrument of the KGB, now the FSB. Their patriarch Kirill is a former KGB agent who owns two yachts. To be blunt, it's a racket. The Russian government is, in many ways, a criminal enterprise pretending to uphold a great Christian ideology.

This is the old story of Russian conservatism — and it never worked. It didn't work before Peter the Great, and it's not going to work now. All it does is lead the country into war, which is unsustainable. There are people who want to keep going back to this and will keep trying, but honestly, it's a fool's errand.

You know, there's a variety of far-right thinking in Russia. Some support Tsarist ideas, others support the USSR, and some even support both at the same time

Russian conservatism has always been derived from German conservatism. If you read German conservative thinkers of the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries, you'll see their ideas spread eastward, and the Russians adopted them — adding their own concept of Christianity. But it doesn't work. They can't sustain the state on that basis, and it invariably leads to war. And it's a wars that Russia always loses.

If we go back to the end of the war and imagine the war ending with some kind of peace deal, the problem is this: Russia doesn't trust any promises from a U.S. president because the next administration could just cancel them. Ukraine doesn't trust Russia because they always lie. So how do we get out of this triangle where nobody believes in any agreement?

That's an old argument. People say we can't sign an agreement with Russia because when Putin leaves, who knows what the next leader will do? But, formally speaking, Putin's hold on power is less secure than Donald Trump's. Trump is set to be president until January 2029, all things being equal. Putin could be gone tomorrow. Who would succeed him? So that's no longer a strong argument.

The real argument from Ukraine is that the Russians lie. Russia has broken eight international treaties by invading Ukraine. That's a serious point and a fundamental reason against negotiation.

But if there is going to be a negotiation, it must be serious. Right now, there is no real negotiation. What we have is a charade. The Russians come in and say, "Surrender, and then we'll talk". That's not going to happen. Putin may think he can win, but he can't. He's not going to win. Ukraine will fight to the death — that much is clear. I told my wife when this started that Ukrainians would win because they're skilled at partisan warfare, and we have experience proving that.

The Russians have had three years and every advantage, yet they're not going to win. The cost for them will be ruinous. European support is now firmly behind Ukraine. Unless Russia is ready to negotiate seriously, I don't expect anything meaningful to come out of tomorrow's talks.

So, if we try to make some kind of prediction looking ahead to the end of 2025 — I'm not a fan of predictions, but still — do you think the war will still be going on, become frozen, or could we see a real breakthrough? And maybe even some involvement from a Trump administration?

Well, you know, you have to be careful not to predict what you want to see happen. What I would like to see is someone in the Trump administration suddenly waking up to reality and supporting Ukraine, because Ukraine can win. But I don't think there will be peace by the end of this year.

I don't think the Russian government is willing to negotiate seriously about this or accept that Ukraine will remain an independent state. What's more, I believe they will eventually have to accept that Ukraine is going to be part of NATO. I don't see any other solution for European security besides Ukraine's NATO membership. It's what Ukraine wants, what it needs, and what I think more and more European governments support—although they certainly didn't before. And whether or not Donald Trump wants it, I believe it's necessary.

Republicans also criticize Democrats for not having a clear plan for Ukraine's victory

Look, Biden didn't have a plan for victory. Trump certainly doesn't have one either. No one in America has had a clear plan for victory — and that's part of the problem. Without a plan, or what we call a theory of victory, there's no real strategy.

Ukraine does have a strategy, but it can't fully implement it without consistent and strong support from the United States. Their theory of victory depends on that support from both the U.S. and Europe. But the United States itself doesn't have a theory of victory — neither Biden nor Trump. And that's a fundamental part of the problem.