Smuggling death: How North Korea and Russia are upgrading ballistic missiles thanks to the West

The fact that the Russians are committing war crimes against Ukraine is no secret to Americans, Japanese, Swiss, and representatives of other civilized nations. It is absolutely clear that even when military sites are targeted during missile and drone strikes, the Russian command often chooses weapons that are wholly indiscriminate, and the chances of striking even a legitimate target without harming civilians are practically nonexistent.

One of the most egregious violations of international humanitarian law is the Russians’ use of missiles produced by North Korea. These missiles are so inaccurate that almost every launch (unless the munition falls into a field) results in widespread destruction and non-combatant fatalities. And the saddest part is that all these deaths could have been avoided if Western countries had fully enforced sanctions on North Korea. After all, the KN-23/KN-24 contain over 90 components manufactured in factories across the globe—specifically in the US, Germany, the Netherlands, and Japan.

24tv.ua, together with experts from the Defense Forces of Ukraine who specialize in studying Russia’s armaments, analyzed which countries are indirectly linked to the production of Kim Jong Un’s extremely powerful short-range ballistic missiles. They looked into how North Korean military personnel have participated in the war long before any ground troops were sent, how extensively the KN-23/24 have been upgraded, and why this could strengthen North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. Read the full analysis in the article.

Since evidence of Russia’s war crimes is extremely sensitive information for the Kremlin, for security reasons we cannot publish the documents we worked with, nor can we disclose the names or positions of the experts.

The missile that is extremely hard to intercept

As the experts who worked at the crash and impact sites confirm, the KN-24 (Hwasong‑11B) or its longer-range “sister” KN‑23 (Hwasong‑11Ga) are extremely challenging targets for air defence systems. In principle, this can be said about any ballistic missile, but when it comes to the launch-to-intercept ratio, Russia’s 9M723 ‘Iskander‑M’ appears much easier for systems like Patriot or SAMP/T. For example, to hit just one KN‑23 that flew toward Kyiv on 6 June, the Air Force had to expend numerous extremely expensive Patriot interceptors. Unfortunately, defenders were unable to shoot down the second North Korean missile.

Moreover, in recent years the Russians have been using ballistic missiles as the primary means to strike at long distances. Ukraine simply lacks the capacity to secure its airspace with anti‑missile systems across most of its territory due to an insufficient number of systems and inability to protect them (especially in frontline and border zones). Fully aware of this, Putin’s subordinates and accomplices deliberately strike cities that are least protected, including Kyiv, which remains a Kremlin priority.

Unlike the 9M723 used by the Iskander system, which has a warhead mass of 480 kg, the KN‑23 and KN‑23A are significantly more powerful. Their warheads weigh up to one tonne.

KN‑23 launch during tests in southeastern North Korea in 2019 / Photo from official sources of the Korean People’s Army

North Korean specialists were involved in the war long before sending special forces

The Russians’ use of North Korean ballistic missiles can loosely be divided into two campaigns. The first lasted roughly a year: from 29 December 2023 (the day of the Zaporizhzhia strike) until the end of 2024, and the second is still ongoing.

Attacks on Zaporizhzhia starting 29 December 2023 marked the beginning of North Korean missile use in Ukraine / Photo: Zaporizhzhia Regional Military-Civil Administration

Experts say that at the start of these missile attacks, the launches were carried out not by Russian specialists but by North Korean military personnel. While the Russians were still mastering the missile complex, it was operated by Kim Jong Un’s subordinates.

Structure of a KN‑23/24 missile battery / Infographic

After training, the missile batteries transferred to Moscow were operated exclusively by Russians. The North Korean dictator's ballistic missiles proved extremely inaccurate. Nonetheless, the Kremlin used them to strike rear areas of Ukraine that the Iskander could not reach. Thus, North Korean ballistics became the Russians’ primary means of launching strikes at ranges up to 800 km — even though hitting a targeted area was nearly impossible.

In an attempt to strike what was likely a military target near Kyiv on 26 August 2024, the Russians missed two missiles by over 1.5 km, and the other two by nearly 5 km.

KN‑23s, launched in pairs, could not have been aimed at any nearby target—there was nothing within several kilometers of the drop zone. Fortunately, no one was killed. The impact points of one pair were about 800 m apart, and the other nearly 3 km.

Visualization of deviation distances for missiles launched from one launcher at a military target in Kyiv region / Infographic

Every missile strike by North Korea is indiscriminate

There have been numerous strikes where experts couldn’t even determine what the enemy was aiming at. For example, on 23 January 2024 at 15:00, Russian forces conducted a missile strike on the Pokrovsk district of Donetsk Oblast. Two KN‑23/24 fell in open fields near Zvirove and Hryshyne villages, while two others completely destroyed private houses at 54 Oleksa Beresta Street in Pokrovsk and 32 Nova Street in Rivne village.

Scatter of missiles likely fired at a single target / Infographic

There were no military or dual-use facilities within kilometers of any impact. If one assumes the Russians hit what they intended, it was deliberate murder of peaceful Ukrainians. Otherwise, the attack was indiscriminate—a gross violation of international humanitarian law. Parties to an armed conflict must distinguish between civilians and combatants and refrain from strikes when civilian harm is likely.

The Pokrovsk strike killed nine people, including five children. Eleven others were injured.

One of the houses that was hit was home to a large family that had relocated from Russian-occupied territories. They had been given accommodation in the village... Nothing was left of them. Not even remains could be found.

Result of a North Korean missile strike on the outskirts of Pokrovsk / Photo by the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast

During the conditional first campaign of KN‑23/24 use, there were many strikes resulting in mass civilian casualties. Despite their obvious inability to hit military targets, the Russians still launched these missiles into densely populated areas of various cities.

For instance, on 23 February 2024 they struck Pavlohrad in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; on 18 August the same year—Rozhivka village near Brovary, Kyiv Oblast; on 26 August and 2 September 2024 — they hit Dnipro; and on 31 December — they struck Vasylkiv, Kyiv Oblast.

The Koreans not only test missiles in Ukraine but also upgrade them

In 2025, we began to face more accurate North Korean ballistic missiles. Their deviation from the programmed target is now measured in hundreds of meters instead of kilometers. Still, the KN‑23/24 remain banned from use in densely populated areas, as they cannot ensure target precision.

Yet the fact remains: North Korean engineers have made significant progress in improving their ballistics. It can be assumed that the Chinese might be involved, but without Russian participation, explaining such Pyongyang defense industry achievements would be extremely difficult.

Previously, Hwasong‑11Ga/B could hardly be guided after launch. Once reaching exo-atmospheric trajectory, it would begin to fall and its flight correction systems could not bring it onto the intended path. Now, this fundamental issue has almost been resolved.

The cooperation between the Kremlin and North Korea runs so deep that it's not surprising if Russian missile experts are transferring technology in exchange for munitions—or simply helping to improve ballistic guidance systems, or even installing their own modules on these missiles. We must admit that when targeting our defense industry facilities, the KN‑23 and KN‑24 inflict significant destruction.

A vivid example of an inaccurate launch of an upgraded North
Korean missile occurred when one impacted a two‑story apartment building on Kremenetskyi Provulok, 5 in Kyiv. Evidently, the Russians intended to hit the Antonov state enterprise, whose territory begins only 600 meters from the explosion site.

The powerful impact reduced a sizeable building to rubble. Thirteen people were killed, ninety wounded. Fifteen houses were damaged within a 300-meter radius.

Hardly anything remained of the two‑story building in Kyiv / Photo by SES Ukraine in Kyiv

There have been many similar strikes on our territory by the Russians. North Korean missiles, launched by the war criminals, average two per day, and almost every time civilians are killed. The most recent atrocious case—with multiple casualties—was the death of three children in Korostyshiv, Zhytomyr Oblast. Russian missile crews targeted a KN‑23 at a house where the Martyniuk family lived.

Impact site of a KN‑23 in Korostyshiv, Zhytomyr Oblast / Photo by SES Zhytomyr

Seventeen‑year‑old Roman, twelve‑year‑old Tamara, and her four‑years‑younger brother Stanislav were found under the rubble. Rescue teams recovered their bodies.

The deceased children of the Martyniuk family / Photo from Facebook of Gustav Olizar Lyceum No. 1, Korostyshiv City Council

As in nearly all missile strikes on Ukraine using Korean-made ballistic technology, there were no military targets within kilometers of the impact in Korostyshiv. Experts suspect the KN‑23 deviated so far because the Russians were launching it at its maximum range. The distance from the Martyniuk house to the North Korean missile battery's launch location was approximately 750 kilometers.

The missile that should not exist

Although neither Moscow nor Pyongyang admit to the sale of short-range missiles, their purchase violates multiple sanctions and UN resolutions. North Korea is under restrictions that preclude all arms trade and technology exchange. Russia, China, the US, the UK, France, and ten non‑permanent UN Security Council members have unanimously adopted resolutions legally binding all UN member states to uphold the arms embargo, monitor end‑users of military and dual‑use goods to prevent transfers to Pyongyang, and inspect ships bound for North Korea.

In 2006, these sanctions were supported by Japan (UN Security Council Resolution 1718). In 2009, Germany voted for expanded restrictions (Resolution 1874). A third resolution, aimed at further restricting North Korea’s weapons capabilities, was adopted in 2016 (Resolution 2321).

Despite all these sanctions, North Korea calmly continued producing ballistic missiles of all ranges — including those capable of carrying nuclear warheads up to 5,500 km or more. To manufacture each such munition, Pyongyang successfully procures numerous components from Western countries.

Which manufacturers and countries are “assisting” in making North Korean ballistic missiles?

In the guidance and control unit of the KN‑23/24 ballistic missile system, Ukrainian experts found nearly 90 foreign-manufactured components.

Products from 16 tech-giant companies in the United States, 9 from China, 5 from Switzerland, 4 from Japan, 2 from Germany, and one Dutch firm ended up in North Korea, later enabling the flight of deadly missiles aimed at Ukrainian civilians.

See the list of companies whose products North Korea uses to produce KN‑23/24 missiles:

The majority of these components are not classified as military—but manufacturers must monitor end‑users of microchips. Still, the fact remains: Kim Jong Un obtains enough Western goods to threaten the entire world.

Obviously, these aren’t direct contracts supplying MOSFETs, diodes, sensors, etc., to North Korea’s defense industry—they are smuggled in illegally.

North Korea’s geographical isolation and aviation/maritime restrictions mean that Western components only reach it via illicit routes through Russia and China—the only countries bordering Pyongyang by land (excluding South Korea, which is effectively inaccessible across the 38th parallel).

Until 2022, Russia could aid Kim Jong Un's regime—but after the invasion of Ukraine, it too struggled to source components for its own missiles—and to import them. Therefore, most electronics for all Hwasong-series missiles likely come via the People’s Republic of China, which is also within the threat range of KN‑23/24—alongside Russia, Japan, and South Korea. After all, no one can guarantee that the North Korean dictator would not use his weapons—even against his own allies.

China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea are all in the potential strike zone of KN‑23/24 missiles / Screenshot from Google Maps

As with Western-sourced drone parts smuggled into Russia, manufacturers likely sell their electronic components through shell companies. However, fake intermediaries do not absolve Western tech giants of responsibility. If civilized nations had truly enforced sanctions and controlled distribution routes, neither Moscow, nor Pyongyang, nor any other countries undermining global order would be able to produce missiles.

The KN‑23 and KN‑24, adopted into service in 2018, should never have existed—without Western components, North Korea could not have mass-produced them, nor would the Russians have been able to use them against Ukraine.

That said, history has no rollback, and the de facto alliance between Kim Jong Un and Putin opens new possibilities for North Korea. The combat use of Hwasong‑11Ga/B in Russia’s war against Ukraine and their further upgrade could have serious implications for Western countries. Just as Moscow has improved its Iskander-M systems, so too could North Korea. Moreover, improvements already applied to KN‑23/24 may be integrated into longer‑range North Korean missiles—even up to ICBM capability. Missile defense systems evolve much more slowly than offensive weapons, making Kim’s missiles potentially invulnerable to interception by MIM-104 Patriot and even newer THAAD systems. That means missiles with American, Japanese, German, and other Western components may be launched at the very people who produced them. After all, Kim Jong Un continues to threaten the US with nuclear strike. And the Russians themselves could strike Europe—with either their own arsenal or the KN‑23/KN‑24.