Hungary: Are there mechanisms to counter Orban's pre-election manipulations regarding Ukraine?

Viktor Orbán’s parasitism on European integration is nothing short of political fraud or fraudulent clientelism. Orbanism is aggressive and mean-spirited, yet shortsighted. No electoral dictatorship in Europe has ever been able to rule forever, and Orbán will be no exception to this rule.

The Hungarian press, serving Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, is heavily and unprecedentedly using Ukraine as a «bogeyman» in the elections. A look at the main pro-Orbán outlets – Magyar Nemzet, Origo, and Mandiner – reveals a visceral hostility toward the Ukrainian state, which they portray as the greatest threat to the Hungarian people.

The key pro-Orbán newspaper, Magyar Nemzet, regularly publishes articles accusing Ukraine of energy pressure, interference in Hungary’s internal affairs, and violations of minority rights. The publication’s narratives include claims of «planned attacks» on energy security, the forced mobilization of ethnic Hungarians, and attempts to influence elections, which, according to Magyar Nemzet, threatens European security.

An article in Magyar Nemzet titled «Ukrajna finanszírozása felzabálná a magyar jövőt, ehhez gyárt terveket a Tisza Párt» argues that financing Ukraine will exhaust Hungary’s future, with the «Tisza» Party allegedly contributing to these plans.

Miklós Szánthó, Director General of the Center for Fundamental Rights, stated that the war and funding for Ukraine have become a strategic goal of the European Union, the costs of which will ultimately be paid by the citizens of member states.

Ukraine and war financing will consume Hungary’s future, and «Tisza» is developing ready-made plans for this, wrote Miklós Szánthó. According to the analysis, Viktor Orbán’s main assertion is that the conflict surrounding the closure of the «Druzhba» oil pipeline is actually about the future of the Hungarian economy. European leaders are increasingly moving towards further war financing, while the burden falls on the member states, noted the Director General of the Center for Fundamental Rights.

The war in Ukraine and the funding of Ukraine are increasingly becoming a matter of life and death for Brussels, and the Hungarian right-wing is essentially standing in the way of the military axis. However, if the EU were to move toward further financing of the war not only on a tactical but also on a strategic level, the costs would ultimately be paid by the citizens of the member states. Brussels’ motivation for this is clear: the money provided to Zelenskyy so far under the label of «loans» could only be returned to the EU on the condition that Russia pays reparations in the event of a total military defeat; therefore, in their eyes, the war and further bloodshed are effectively a prerequisite for a financial guarantee.

The Prime Minister noted that Ukraine’s accession to the EU and long-term funding of the war could mean that Hungarian funds are being directed toward the conflict, which would narrow Hungary’s economic space and future opportunities in the short term, Miklós Szánthó recalled. «If we allow them to take our money, the country will fall into debt, and our children and grandchildren will bear the consequences».

Magyar Nemzet continues: «In this situation, energy policy and the oil blockade – an instrument of blackmail by Kyiv and the Brussels administration conspiring with it, as well as the potential beneficiary of «Tisza» – become key issues», the Director General noted.

The conflict surrounding the «Druzhba» pipeline is thus also a test of strength: it is about whether Hungary can maintain its peace and sovereignty, as well as access to cheap energy sources. If the blackmail plan succeeds and we are cut off from cheap Russian oil according to Péter Magyar’s plans, it will have an immediate impact on overhead costs, industrial competitiveness, and the economy as a whole.

The political dimension of the debate is also evident. In Hungary, there are actors, including «Tisza», who are ready to adapt to Brussels’ logic of war and implement the economic decisions associated with it. Therefore, the political debate centers on whether Hungary will maintain its energy security and economic room for maneuver, or whether it will integrate into a European system where war financing gradually consumes future resources and security. On April 12, it will be decided whether Hungary retains the ability to act according to its own economic interests or is forced to join the European war, «Miklós Szántó concluded in his analysis».

It is interesting to wonder what «our money» they are talking about. After all, Viktor Orbán’s parasitism on European integration is nothing more than political fraud or fraudulent clientelism. Sensible citizens of Hungary understand this well. These multi-billion dollar handouts from Brussels cannot continue indefinitely. Orbanism is aggressive and mean-spirited, yet short-sighted. No electoral dictatorship in Europe has ever been able to rule forever, and Orbán will be no exception to this rule.

In contemporary Hungarian political discourse ahead of the elections scheduled for April 12, 2026, Ukraine – through the mechanism of escalating a «politics of fear» – has been transformed from a neighbor into a central tool for domestic electoral mobilization. An analysis of the media strategy employed by Viktor Orbán’s government and the Fidesz party reveals key aspects of using the ‘Ukrainian card’ as an existential threat.

• The «war or peace» narrative: The core thesis of pro-Orbán propaganda is that only the current government can guarantee peace. In contrast, the opposition (specifically Peter Magyar’s TISZA party) is portrayed as acting on orders from «Brussels warmongers» and being ready to send Hungarian soldiers to the front lines in Ukraine. This message is heavily promoted through state media and outdoor advertising, often using AI-generated emotional imagery, such as posters featuring President Zelenskyy alongside European officials.
• Discrediting sovereignty and institutions. The Hungarian press systematically dehumanizes Ukraine, denying its subjectivity. Orbán publicly stated that Ukraine has ceased to be a sovereign state and is only a tool of the West.
• Accusations of interference in elections. In order to neutralize the successes of the opposition, which according to recent polls is ahead of Fidesz by 10-12%, the government officially accuses Kyiv of «coordinated measures to interfere in the Hungarian elections». This allows it to channel internal dissatisfaction with the economy (inflation, the decline of healthcare), switching society’s attention to the «external enemy».
• Energy blackmail and intimidation by collapse. Propaganda exploits the topic of stopping oil transit through the Druzhba pipeline, ignoring the facts of Russian shelling of infrastructure and accusing Ukraine of an «energy blockade». Voters are scared that supporting Ukraine will lead to the economic collapse of Hungary, while refusing to help Kyiv will supposedly keep gasoline prices low.

This strategy is aimed at preserving a loyal electorate in rural areas, where the dominance of state media is absolute. Ukraine in this context plays the role of an ideal antagonist through which Budapest is waging its proxy war with Brussels, trying to maintain power in the face of the most serious political challenge in the last 16 years.

There is no doubt that Viktor Orbán’s anti-Ukrainian campaign before the parliamentary elections is a classic example of the instrumentalization of foreign policy for the internal mobilization of the electorate, and although it is almost impossible to completely stop it from the outside, there are mechanisms to significantly limit its effectiveness.

It is worth noting that the pro-Moscow Orban’s strategy is based on creating an «existential threat» in the person of Ukraine and Brussels in order to divert attention from economic stagnation, high inflation and the growing popularity of the opposition party «Tysa» of Peter Magyar.

This campaign can be thwarted through three levels of influence. The first is the institutional pressure of the European Union. The EU has the opportunity to block the multi-billion financing of the Hungarian government. In this way, to push Budapest to unblock 90 billion European loans for Ukraine. Or even initiate the procedure under Article 7 of the EU Treaty to suspend Hungary’s voting rights, which would demonstrate to the Hungarian voter the real price of isolationism.

However, Brussels is currently acting cautiously, softening criticism so as not to give Orban a reason to accuse the EU of direct interference in the elections, which he is already trying to do, calling the opposition «agents of Brussels and Kyiv».

The second level is informational counteraction and support for democratic institutions. Since the Fidesz election campaign is saturated with disinformation (for example, about the «forced mobilization of Hungarians» or the use of AI billboards with the President of Ukraine), it is critically important to support independent media and fact-checking organizations in Hungary, which are engaged in verifying the authenticity of statements by politicians, news and information in the media, revealing fakes and manipulations.

The third level is Ukraine’s strategic restraint. Currently, any sharp reaction from Kyiv to Orbán’s provocations (accusations of espionage, election interference or disputes over the Druzhba pipeline) is immediately used by Hungarian propaganda as evidence of «Ukrainian aggression» against Hungary.

The most effective tactic to thwart Orbán’s plans is to deprive him of his monopoly on the «agenda». When the opposition led by Magyar focuses on internal problems: corruption, the crisis in the healthcare and education systems, Orban’s anti-Ukrainian rhetoric begins to look like an artificial attempt to escape from reality.

Therefore, it is possible to hinder Viktor Orban’s campaign not so much through bans from Brussels, but by creating conditions where the cost of such a policy for the average Hungarian (due to EU sanctions or economic isolation) will be higher than the emotional effect of fear of the «external enemy» invented by Orbanists.

It is obvious that the strategy for leveling the political influence of Viktor Orban and his Fidesz party requires a transition from reactive condemnation to a pragmatic construction of the «cost dilemma» of continuing his long-term rule for the Hungarian electorate.

Since the basis of Orban’s regime is a specific social contract: restrictions on liberal standards in exchange for relatively stable welfare and protection of identity from artificially accentuated threats. And the deconstruction of this model is possible only if the correlation between loyalty to the regime and the economic security of the individual is broken.

The key tool in this context is the EU engagement mechanism, which requires the transformation of the European Union from a purely legal regulator into a factor of real economic influence through the creation of a financial deficit.

When the delay in funds from recovery funds or structural funds moves from abstract macroeconomic indicators to the plane of real inflation, infrastructure degradation or reduction of social subsidies, the emotional capital of the «fight against Brussels» begins to rapidly depreciate.

Everything indicates that populist regimes are extremely sensitive to «electoral calculation». After all, as soon as the price of ideological conformity exceeds the benefit from state paternalistic support, the mobilization potential of fear of the «external enemy» loses its effectiveness.

Moreover, economic isolation and increased sanctions pressure create a situation of «toxicity» of the Hungarian jurisdiction for foreign investment, which is critical for an export-oriented economy.

And the creation of conditions where Hungarian business and the middle class find themselves faced with a choice between integration into global markets and the isolationist course of the government leads to the internal erosion of the elite.

Thus, the strategic goal is to radically increase the «cost of maintaining power» for the Hungarian voter by Viktor Orbán. When each subsequent populist decision entails a direct deterioration in the purchasing power of citizens, the rational interest of the voter inevitably comes into conflict with the imposed ideological construction, which creates a window of opportunity for a political alternative.

This strategy may be aimed at dismantling the very foundations of the Hungarian illiberal model. After all, Viktor Orbán’s regime has been based on a specific form of an unspoken social contract for years: the restriction of certain democratic freedoms and the concentration of power and financial resources in the hands of Orbán’s oligarchic clan in exchange for illusory economic stability and protection from «external threats» (migration, EU bureaucracy, liberal values).

A sharp and radical increase in the «cost of maintaining power» actually means the rupture of this contract. When the deceptive political comfort that creates the acceptance of the existing rules of the game ceases to be compensated by material well-being, the voter moves from the stage of emotional identification with the leader to the stage of pragmatic audit of state decisions.

After all, the Hungarian voter is able to ignore corruption or the narrowing of freedom of speech as long as his personal purchasing power remains unchanged. However, when the price of loyalty becomes excessive (inflation, falling real incomes, degradation of public services), a conflict arises between the «imposed ideology» of the Orban regime (Hungary as a fortress) and «everyday realism» (an empty refrigerator).

And this creates conditions for the delegitimization of power: populist slogans begin to be perceived not as a defense of national interests, but as a cause of personal financial losses.

The window of opportunity to replace Viktor Orban’s regime appears not simply because of dissatisfaction, but because of a change in the structure of the political market. The deterioration of economic indicators forces the apolitical part of society and «soft» supporters of the government to look for an alternative that would offer not another ideology, but effective management.

In such a context, the political alternative should position itself as a force that will «return rationality» to public administration, contrasting Viktor Orban’s «dear ideology» with the «realistic pragmatism» of the opposition.

However, it is worth considering that under the conditions of Orban’s monopolization of the Hungarian media space, the authoritarian regime may try to present economic difficulties as «external aggression» (sabotage by Brussels or sanctions).

Therefore, the success of the strategy depends not only on the fact of the deterioration of life, but on whether the opposition forces will be able to consolidate a direct cause-and-effect relationship in the mass consciousness: «poverty is the direct price of Orbán’s policies».

The transformation of loyalty into a «precious asset» is a classic tool for destabilizing hybrid regimes. If the cost of ideological identity becomes unbearable for the middle class, the regime loses its mass base, turning from a «people’s representative» into an «economic burden», which is a harbinger of systemic political transformation.