Orban's elections for Hungary: is a «Budapest Maidan» possible?

On the eve of the elections in Hungary, it is becoming clear that neither side recognizes their results as legitimate. Is Peter Magyar preparing to convene a «Budapest Maidan?» And is Viktor Orbán ready to forcefully disperse the «Maidan» in Budapest?

The situation in Hungary before the elections on April 12 is characterized by unprecedented polarization, where an institutional crisis of trust creates the basis for a potential extra-parliamentary confrontation. The figure of Peter Magyar, who transformed from an insider of the system to the leader of the opposition movement, radically changed the dynamics: now the protest potential is based not only on liberal values, but also on the disappointment of the conservative electorate.

The question of the «Budapest Maidan» is becoming a logical consequence of the fact that opposition forces and a part of society accuse the government of Viktor Orbán of creating a «captured state».

After all, if in Hungary the courts, the media and the electoral system are subordinate to one political force, the legal mechanisms for changing power through elections are perceived as ineffective or unequal. Therefore, the Hungarian elections of 2026 look not as a fair political competition, but as a plebiscite on the legitimacy of Viktor Orbán’s regime itself. In the event of the announcement of results that the opposition will interpret as falsified or manipulative (given the control of Fidesz over the media and election commissions), Peter Magyar will probably use his mobilization resources to bring hundreds of thousands of people to the streets.

His strategy is already based on direct contact with the masses, bypassing traditional media, which is a classic sign of preparation for a protracted street confrontation. Viktor Orbán’s reaction to such a scenario will depend on the scale and radicalization of the protests. It can be assumed that both Orbán and Putin are carefully analyzing the experience of Ukraine. And to neutralize the opposition «Budapest Maidan», they will launch their «Anti-Maidan».

A study of the methods of functioning of modern authoritarian and hybrid regimes shows that Viktor Orban is not just studying the Ukrainian experience of the «Maidan», but also reducing the opposition to such scenarios to the rank of a survival strategy for his government. And the concept of «Anti-Maidan» as implemented by Orbanists has transformed from street clashes into a complex system of preventive dismantling of any civil activity. Here Orban acts through the tools of «soft power»: legal discrimination and discrediting political opponents. The creation of the Sovereignty Protection Office (SPO) in Hungary in December 2023 was a direct response to the fear of external influence.

And any opposition activity similar to the protests of Peter Magyar is marked in advance as a betrayal of «national interests». Orban’s «Anti-Maidan» is not a joke, but total control over the media space and mobilization of the conservative electorate through the proclamation of protection from the «Brussels dictate», which makes street protests marginal in the eyes of provincial voters.

Viktor Orbán understands that to prevent the «Budapest Maidan», it is necessary not only to disperse the crowd, but to destroy the very possibility of its organizational and financial autonomy. His strategy is to create a «managed civil society», which acts as a human shield for the regime, replacing genuine grassroots protest with a state imitation of the people’s will.

Throughout his long rule, Orbán has demonstrated the ability to «flexible authoritarianism», avoiding direct violence in favor of legal and economic pressure. However, the emergence of a real threat to his power could change the rules of the game. And the Hungarian security structures have undergone significant ideological and personnel filtering during the years of the Fidesz government, which makes them potentially loyal to the current prime minister.

A violent dispersal of the «Maidan» in Budapest cannot be ruled out if the authoritarian regime declares that the protests will threaten the functioning of state institutions or somehow manages to provoke some of the protesters to seize administrative buildings. Then Orban may try to legitimize the use of force by appealing to the need to «protect sovereignty from external interference», branding the protesters as «agents of foreign influence». Predicting the development of events, three key scenarios can be distinguished.

The first is inertial: protests take place, but due to the lack of a united front of the entire opposition and a strict information blockade, they gradually fade away under the pressure of selective detentions of protesters and trials, which allows Orban to retain power at the cost of final international isolation.

The second scenario is the escalation scenario: Peter Magyar’s activities will provoke a deep split within the political elite of Hungary, and the forceful dispersal will become a point of no return and will lead to a nationwide strike and intervention by the institutions of the European Union. Which may end either with the fall of the government or the country’s transition to an open dictatorship.

The third scenario is a compromise: under pressure from the street, Orban agrees to certain concessions (for example, re-elections in certain precincts or changes to electoral legislation) in order to defuse the atmosphere, buy time and wait for the energy of the protest to dissipate. In any case, Hungary is entering a phase of deep political turbulence, where the street becomes a more important political instrument than the ballot box.

If we analyze the first scenario of events after the elections in Hungary in more detail, then, most likely, Viktor Orban’s regime is counting on the gradual degradation of the protest movement.

Hoping that the main factors of defeat will be the lack of coalition unity of opponents and the information vacuum. In this case, the Orbanists will choose the «salami» tactic – selective arrests and trials to demoralize society. This could preserve Viktor Orban’s power in parallel with the transformation of Hungary into an international exile.

This inertial scenario of the development of the political situation in Hungary indicates the transition of Viktor Orbán’s regime from a hybrid electoral autocracy to a phase of «consolidated authoritarianism», where the key mechanism for maintaining the status quo is not consensus, but selective suppression and intimidation.

In the absence of a consolidated opposition front, protest activity loses its strategic purpose, turning into a series of disparate speeches that Hungarian state propaganda will easily pass off as a fiasco by Orbán’s opponents.

Then, a tough information blockade built through such loyal to the government media holdings as KESMA will allow the regime to effectively dehumanize protesters, branding them as «agents of foreign influence», which eliminates the possibility of expanding the social base of the protest beyond the borders of large cities.

The strategy of «selective detentions» and spot trials will demonstrate a transition to the tactics of «surgical repression», which are aimed not at mass terror, but at raising the price of participation in political life for the most active counter-elites.

This can create a «spiral of silence» effect and demoralize the part of society that expected rapid changes. Under such conditions, the fading of protests will mean the complete collapse of the legal system and the destruction of the foundations of legality, as the judicial branch of power is finally integrated into the executive branch, ensuring the legitimization of persecution under the guise of protecting public order.

Currently, Hungary’s loss of the status of a «flawed democracy» in favor of an «authoritarian enclave» will trigger the mechanisms of financial pressure from the European Union. Such as the complete freezing of funds from the Cohesion Fund and the Recovery and Resilience Fund (RRF), which will deprive the regime of the economic base to maintain the loyalty of the electorate through social subsidies.

Then Viktor Orban will be forced to compensate for the deficit of Western investments by deepening dependence on non-European political actors, primarily China and Russia, which will finally turn Hungary into a geopolitical anomaly within NATO and the European Union.

The preservation of Orban’s power can be achieved by strategically weakening the subjectivity of the state on the world stage. And Hungary, which during Viktor Orban’s premiership sought regional leadership in Central Europe, trying to play the role of a «special» mediator between the East (Russian Federation, China) and the West, will turn into an isolated «reserve of illiberalism». A state entity whose survival will depend entirely on the stability of the personalist vertical and the receipt of aid from Moscow and Beijing.

The second scenario of events can be further defined as a scenario of systemic destabilization, internal split and delegitimization of the Orban regime controlled by the power bloc. According to it, events can develop from the street protest movement of Peter Magyar into a full-fledged internal crisis of the power elites. Here, the key factor becomes the destruction of the monolithic nature of Fidesz, when part of the political and business establishment begins to consider Peter Magyar as a viable alternative to the current course.

The use of harsh police measures or forceful dispersal by the authorities in this situation will turn into a trigger for irreversible changes. When, instead of suppressing the protest, violence from the state will provoke a «martyrdom effect» and deprive the Orban regime of the remnants of democratic legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. Which will turn the internal political tension into an existential crisis of the regime, where a return to the status quo becomes impossible.

The growth of the political influence of Peter Magyar’s Tisza party could become a critical test for Viktor Orban’s «hybrid regime». In this model, the key detonator is not only external protest pressure, but primarily internal destabilization of the power vertical.

A successful attempt by Magyar to achieve a split in the ranks of the Hungarian political elite would mean the destruction of the monolithic nature of the Fidesz party, where loyalty is traditionally based on patronage and client ties. The transition of a critical mass of middle and senior functionaries to the side of the opposition movement and the Tisza party could create a situation of «dual power» in the information and administrative fields, forcing the current government to resort to reactive rather than strategic actions.

The forcible dispersal of peaceful protests could become a fatal limit for Orban. Because the collapse of the illusion of «soft legitimacy» will mean the regime’s transition, for the sake of its own survival, to open coercion.

Forceful suppression in conditions of high social mobilization usually causes a «backlash» effect, leading to a nationwide strike. Then the shutdown of strategic enterprises and transport hubs paralyzes the country’s economic life, finally undermining the social contract on which the regime was based – conditional stability in exchange for restrictions on political freedoms.

In such a case, the intervention of the European Union institutions in the crisis becomes inevitable and takes the form of unprecedented legal and financial pressure. The use of the rule of law mechanism and the potential application of Article 7 of the EU Treaty to suspend Hungary’s voting rights in the EU Council create conditions for external isolation.

This presents the ruling elite with a dilemma: capitulation in order to preserve European subsidies and avoid sanctions that would lead to the fall of the government and the calling of early elections, or a final break with democratic norms.

The final phase of the scenario involves a critical moment. In the event of the fall of the government, a painful but democratic transition occurs, where Peter Magyar acts as a consolidating political figure of the new system. Instead, the alternative path leads to a transition to open dictatorship. This involves the introduction of a state of emergency, complete censorship of the media, the arrests of protest leaders, and the country’s actual withdrawal from the legal field of the European Union.

Such a development of events turns Hungary into a «pariah» within the European community, which in the long term threatens not only economic collapse, but also a deep civilizational split in Hungarian society.

This escalation scenario demonstrates that an internal elite crisis, combined with the final determination of the security apparatus with whom it is, is the fastest way to dismantle the consolidated authoritarianism created over the long years of Viktor Orbán’s rule.

The third scenario may mean the transition of Viktor Orbán’s regime to a strategy of «controlled concessions». Under pressure from the mass mobilization of opposition forces, the Orban government may resort to a partial revision of electoral rules or the sanctioning of local re-elections. However, such steps can be regarded not as real democratization, but as a tool for channeling protest potential.

Under such a compromise option, the transformation of Viktor Orban’s political regime in Hungary from the model of «illiberal democracy» to a state of crisis maneuvering will begin, where street mobilization becomes the determining factor of legitimacy. Such a scenario can be classified as a strategic de-escalation aimed at maintaining systemic control through point concessions.

By agreeing to re-elections in individual precincts or cosmetic changes to electoral legislation, the Orban government will not strive for real democratization, but will use the tactic of «letting off steam».

This is a classic example of imitating institutional reforms to neutralize protest potential. After all, by offering the opposition and Hungarian society limited concessions, the regime will try to shift the conflict from the plane of street confrontation into a viscous channel of bureaucratic procedures and court disputes.

Such a strategy is designed to have the effect of exhausting the opposition. After all, protest movements, as a rule, have a limited time resource and are highly dependent on emotional drive. Prolonging the process by the Orban regime through small concessions will allow the authorities to wait for the natural decline in mass activity, while simultaneously splitting the opposition environment into those who are ready for a compromise and radically minded supporters of a complete change of power.

However, Hungary’s entry into the phase of «deep political turbulence» means the erosion of the key pillar of Orbanism – «stability», built on the dominance of one political force. And when the street begins to weigh more than the ballot box, elections are devalued as an effective tool for achieving political change.

In the long term, such a scenario creates a precedent where Orban’s system of power will reveal its critical weaknesses. When any concession made under the pressure of demonstrations becomes, in the perception of protesters, proof of the effectiveness of radical methods, which can lead to a cyclical return of the crisis with each subsequent unpopular decision of the government.

Hungary, in such a case, risks finding itself in a state of permanent instability, where the power vertical is forced to constantly balance between a repressive apparatus and a forced dialogue with the street.

And this may mean that the 2026 elections may lose the status of the final arbiter, turning into just one of the stages of a protracted internal political struggle, where real power is fought not in ballots, but in the ability to control the public space and the agenda.

Although a completely different, radical development of events is possible. Viktor Orban will lose his temper in the first few days after the results are announced against him, and in order not to test his fate, he will decide to flee to Putin in Moscow while he still has the opportunity. If this happens, then Orban will follow Yanukovych’s path.

However, for autocratic leaders (even in a «hybrid regime» system, like in Hungary), the loyalty of the security forces is critically important. Escape is possible only when Orban feels that the army and police will not carry out his orders to suppress the protests.

If he realizes that the security forces are switching sides, Moscow will become his only safe place outside the jurisdiction of the European Union and the International Criminal Court.

If this really happens, the flight of the current (or recently ousted) leader of a NATO country to Moscow will provoke an unprecedented security crisis. The new Hungarian authorities will have to immediately conduct a lustration of the special services, which during the Orban era were deeply integrated in the exchange of information with the terrorist Russian Federation.

This escape will finally consolidate Viktor Orban’s status as a «Trojan horse», which will allow the European Union to more quickly reform the system of unanimous voting. Having made a decision, such as the fact that to resolve any issue in the EU, no less than 75 percent of the votes are needed.

At the same time, there is a danger that in Moscow Orban may turn into an instrument of hybrid warfare. Putin will use him as a «legitimate prime minister in exile» to destabilize Hungary through media resources (which are still under the control of oligarchs loyal to Orban). This will create the risk of a long-term internal civil confrontation.

Also, Viktor Orban’s sudden escape could lead to a collapse of the forint and panic in the markets. However, this will open a window of opportunity for a quick investigation into the corruption schemes of the Mathias Corvinus Collegium (MCC) Foundation. Its activities are under close attention of international institutions and investigators due to its ties to the Orbán government, opaque financing, and suspicion of embezzlement of public funds.

If Viktor Orbán chooses the path of escape to Moscow, it will mean the end of the «Hungarian model» of illiberal democracy due to its complete self-discrediting. Such a development of events will transform Hungary from an ambitious ideological laboratory of the «third way» to another instructive example of the degradation of autocracy.

It cannot be ruled out that it is precisely in these days that Putin is coordinating with Orbán the preparation of his possible «catapult» to Moscow. The prime minister’s capital is being urgently pumped there, and the issue of purchasing an estate for Viktor Orbán on Rublevka near Moscow is being resolved.

It seems that the era of Viktor Orbán is inexorably passing: despite all his efforts, he is unable to maintain control over the country. In this situation, the scenario with asylum from Putin looks much better to Orban than the real threat of appearing before a court in The Hague.