Are Russian elites capable of removing Putin?

The probability of the forcible removal of Putin by the Russian elites is one of the most pressing questions of our time, to which there is currently no clear answer. Despite the emotional desire to see the collapse of the criminal Putin regime as soon as possible, not everything is so clear. Since the traditional «golden snuffbox» or «silk scarf» for Russia may not be enough due to the unprecedented level of the dictator’s personal security and the total control of his regime over the elites.

The Russian state has been rebuilt over the past twenty years in such a way as to make any palace coup, conspiracy of the security forces or autonomous game of the oligarchs as difficult as possible. However, this does not mean that the scenario of the forcible removal of Putin is impossible.

But everything may not happen exactly as the mass consciousness imagines. The key mistake of many is that they perceive the Russian elites as a single political corporation with common interests. In reality, the Russian elite is a complex system of competing clans, where Putin himself acts as the main arbiter.

He is not just a «president for life». Putin is the central balancer between the power structures, big capital, regional barons, special services and bureaucratic groups. His power is based not only on repression, but on personal control over the mechanism of mutual fear of the elites. And each large group of elites knows that it will be destroyed by competitors if the supreme arbiter disappears.

That is why even groups dissatisfied with Putin often fear the fall of the dictator more than the preservation of his power. It is necessary to pay attention to the fact that after the start of the full-scale war against Ukraine, the Russian system has undergone an important transformation.

If earlier the regime was autocratic with minor elements of imitation of collective governance, then after 2022 it became personalist, militarized and completely totalitarian. And in such systems, the elites gradually lose the ability to coordinate independently. Putin purposefully created a structure in which no center of power has sufficient resources for an autonomous coup.

The FSB monitors the army, the army does not trust the special services, the Rosgvardia was created as a counterbalance to the army and society at the same time, and the presidential guard is actually a separate caste with enormous influence. This is a system of mutual control, which is completely built on distrust of each other.

That is why a classic military coup in the style of Latin American juntas is unlikely for Russia. Historically, the Russian army has never been an autonomous political entity. Even in periods of crisis, from the collapse of the USSR to the 1991 coup, the army acted indecisively and depended on the political center.

The modern Russian military command is even less independent. After numerous purges, arrests, and humiliations, the generals understand perfectly well that any attempt at a political game will mean not victory, but a huge risk of liquidation.

In addition, the war in Ukraine has made the power structures even more fragmented: mutual hatred has accumulated between the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, special services, private military structures, and regional groups.

The coup of Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023 became an extremely important test for the current system. Many in the West then decided that the regime was about to collapse. In fact, the coup showed otherwise: even at the moment of a direct forceful challenge to the regime, a significant part of the elites chose passivity rather than active participation in the attempt to change Putin’s power.

This is very typical of personalist regimes. Elites may hate the ruler, but they are even more afraid of the chaos after his fall. Prigozhin demonstrated that the Putin regime’s vertical is not monolithic, but he also showed that there is no ready-made coalition in Russia for an organized seizure of power.

And here we come to the main question: under what conditions does the forcible removal of Putin become realistic? Historically, totalitarian regimes rarely fall due to the moral outrage of the elites. Regimes lose power when the elites understand that the leader is no longer the guarantor of their security, the preservation of wealth, or even survival.

That is, the key factor is not the level of discontent, but a change in the balance of fear. As long as Putin remains a symbol of the system’s stability, his positions will be strong even in the face of economic problems, sanctions, or military setbacks. But if a significant part of the elites comes to the conclusion that it is his presence that is pushing the system towards disaster, then the mechanisms of conspiracy may be triggered.

However, such a conspiracy is unlikely to look like a spectacular coup with tanks in Moscow. Most likely, this would be a closed process within a narrow circle of security forces and intelligence agencies. Russian political culture traditionally gravitates not towards open revolutions at the top, but towards backroom operations.

If the system does indeed reach a decision to replace Putin, it will most likely be presented to the silent population as a «sudden deterioration in health», a «temporary transfer of power» or an internal transit under the control of security forces. In Russian history, power has often changed not through public conflict, but through apparatus conspiracies, when society learned about the result only after the fact.

However, the most dangerous scenario for Putin is not a popular uprising or a liberal opposition. The most dangerous scenario is a combination of three factors: protracted defeats at the front, the decline of the economy and a split among the ruling elites

If the ruling elite begins to perceive the war as strategically lost, and the state’s resources cease to provide for the interests of key clans, then the struggle for the post-Putin future will begin. It is at this point that the risk of internal collusion will increase sharply.

At the same time, there is an important circumstance: the Russian elites do not have a coordinated vision of the future after Putin. This is critical. In many totalitarian countries, coups became possible when there was an alternative coalition with an approximate plan for the transition of power.

In Russia, however, most elites understand that the fall of the current center could trigger an uncontrolled struggle between power groups. For them, it is not just a question of power – it is a question of physical survival, money, the safety of families and the future of the entire system. That is why even potential opponents of Putin often remain passive.

No less important is the fact that Putin systematically eliminated everyone who could potentially become an autonomous political pole. Independent oligarchs were either subordinated or politically destroyed. Regional elites lost their former autonomy, and the federal bureaucracy became completely dependent on the center.

Even popular military commanders are now under tight control. This creates a paradox: a system can be internally weak, but at the same time extremely resistant to a quick coup due to the lack of an organized alternative.

However, the history of totalitarian regimes shows that external stability is often deceptive. Personalist-type regimes can appear unshakable right up to the time of their rapid collapse.

The reason is simple: fear blocks open opposition until the last moment, but when the elites suddenly sense that the center is weakening, the processes can accelerate like an avalanche. This was the case with many dictatorships of the 20th century. The system seems monolithic until it suddenly turns out that no one is ready to defend it anymore.

In the case of Russia, an additional factor is the nuclear status of the state. This means that any internal struggle for power automatically acquires global significance.

That is why a significant part of the Russian nomenklatura, even dissatisfied with the war, is leaning towards the most controlled scenario of the transit. They understand that the chaotic collapse of the regime could create risks not only for Russia, but also for the entire international order.

Can the Russian elites remove Putin by force? Yes, theoretically they can. But not because they suddenly become democratic or morally enlightened. This is possible only when a significant part of the power and bureaucratic core comes to the conclusion that keeping Putin is more dangerous for their survival than removing him.

And even in this case, it will not be a romantic revolution, but a cold operation aimed at preserving the system of power itself. Most likely, post-Putin Russia in such a scenario will not become a democratic state. On the contrary, the elites will try to conduct a controlled transit in order to preserve the totalitarian framework, changing only the top of the pyramid.

The main conclusion is that Putin’s fate largely depends not on the reaction of the population or even on the sanctions as such, but on the internal dynamics of sentiment among the Russian ruling class.

Totalitarian regimes often look unbreakable until the erosion of trust within the elite begins. And if the Kremlin decides to remove Putin, it will not be an act of liberation of Russia, but an attempt by part of the system to save itself from a historical catastrophe.

Of course, then the best option for Putin would be an arrest with his subsequent transfer to the court in The Hague. However, if he drags on too long, then the options of Ceausescu, Muammar Gaddafi, or even Indira Gandhi will await him. Although it is not yet known who from the dictator’s security guards is ready to take on the role of «Putin’s Sikhs».

The Hague tribunal really looks like the most humane and rational scenario for the Kremlin’s master, since international justice provides legal protection, medical care, and relatively comfortable conditions of detention.

But the experience of dictatorships proves that totalitarian leaders are almost never able to soberly assess the point of no return, becoming hostages of their own isolation and distorted information from their closest environment.

The conditions for the implementation of radical internal scenarios, whether a quick execution following the Ceausescu model or a lynching by an angry crowd, as in the case of Gaddafi, ripen not in the open political field, but in the deep shadow of the special services and the Federal Security Service.

The modern Russian power vertical is built on a paranoid duplication of control functions, where each security officer watches over the other, which creates the illusion of absolute security for Putin.

At the same time, it is this architecture of fear that makes the system extremely fragile at the moment of a critical weakening of the center: as soon as the financial or military base of the regime begins to collapse rapidly, the loyalty of the Rosgvardia will turn into a commodity.

«Putin’s Sikhs» will not necessarily be guided by ideological or religious motives, as was the case with Indira Gandhi. For them, the decisive factor will be the banal instinct of self-preservation and the search for security guarantees from the future new government or external players.

The prolongation of the war with Ukraine and the deepening of internal chaos in Russia are inexorably narrowing the window of opportunity for a relatively peaceful transition of power, transforming the immediate environment of dictator Putin from the main shield into the main and most real threat to him.