The Kremlin is starting to praise Péter Magyar. What could this mean?

Telex, one of Hungary’s largest and most influential independent news portals, which closely follows Prime Minister Magyar’s every move and publishes regular interviews with him, published an article by journalist András Nádór titled «Megdicsérte a Kreml szóvivője Magyar Pétert» (Kremlin Spokesperson Praises Péter Magyar).

The article states: «The Kremlin positively assessed Péter Magyar’s statements that Hungary would not supply weapons and military equipment to Ukraine. «If one of the parties says that it considers it unnecessary to add fuel to the fire, this can only be welcomed, «Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Friday, according to Russian state news agency TASS. Peskov also said that peace would come faster if all countries refused to supply weapons to Ukraine».

Telex further notes: «Peter Magyar reported that during their joint meeting he told NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte: Hungary will not send weapons or military equipment to the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Dmitry Peskov stated that Europe cannot be a mediator in resolving the conflict in Ukraine. According to him, Europe is a party to the conflict and therefore cannot act as a mediator in negotiations with Kiev. «At the moment, Europe is on the side of Ukraine in the conflict. Don’t forget that European weapons are firing directly at us, and this cannot be ignored».

If the Kremlin is starting to praise Peter Magyar so openly, and Telex emphasizes this, could it not mean that Putin hopes to reach an agreement with him on pressure on Ukraine, as it was already the case under Orban? Isn’t Magyar preparing to visit Moscow in late summer or early autumn, having «knocked out» of the European Union all those billions of euros that were blocked for Viktor Orban, to agree on the supply of cheap energy to Hungary? After all, by putting forward strange demands, he has begun to actively block Ukraine’s path to the European Union, probably hoping that the Kremlin will appreciate it.

Of course, Peter Magyar’s political evolution can be interpreted in different ways, as can the Kremlin’s strategic calculations regarding the future of Hungarian politics. We should not forget that the Kremlin traditionally supports any political forces in Europe, who oppose the expansion of military aid to Ukraine. From Moscow’s point of view, it does not matter much whether it is the government of Viktor Orban or the government of Peter Magyar. Any position that leads to a reduction in support for Ukraine automatically receives a favorable reaction from the Putin government.

And although it is too early to claim that there is already some kind of hidden political alliance between the Kremlin and Magyar or that Moscow sees him as a future partner like former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, it seems that the Kremlin is trying to draw Peter Magyar into their game. After all, Russian diplomacy historically tries to work with any potential centers of influence in European countries.

And when the Kremlin publicly praises a Western politician’s statement, it is a tool of manipulation to encourage a policy course favorable to Moscow, as well as a deliberate act of strategic communication aimed at dividing Western society and legitimizing its own geopolitical narratives.

Such public praise is rarely a sincere expression of solidarity; instead, it functions as a tool of internal and external propaganda. Inside Russia, it is used to demonstrate to its own population the West’s supposed «enlightenment» or the presence of strong pro-Russian forces there, which is supposed to confirm the correctness of the Kremlin’s actions and reduce the feeling of international isolation.

On the international stage, such «support» acts as a «kiss of death» tactic or, conversely, as fuel for internal polarization in the politician’s country. Depending on the circumstances, Moscow’s approval can either discredit a moderate leader in the eyes of his voters, accusing him of working for the aggressor, or significantly strengthen the positions of radical, populist, or Eurosceptic forces that are deliberately playing to reduce support for Ukraine or weaken Euro-Atlantic unity.

Moscow marks certain theses as «acceptable» for dialogue, trying to expand the boundaries of what is permissible in Western discourse, provoke domestic political debates, sow mutual distrust between allies, and ultimately force Western democracies to reduce pressure on Russia by creating the illusion of the possibility of a quick diplomatic compromise.

The Kremlin understands perfectly well that even having won the election, Péter Magyar is in a difficult political position. He positions himself as a pro-European alternative to Orbán, but at the same time is forced to take into account the sentiments of a significant part of Hungarian society.

For many years, the political narrative of the need to avoid dragging the country into a war between Russia and Ukraine has dominated Hungary. This position has support not only among Orbán’s supporters. Therefore, for Magyar, the statement that Hungary should not send weapons to the war zone may also be an element of a domestic political strategy aimed at expanding his own electoral base.

At the same time, there is another aspect that deserves close attention. In recent weeks, Peter Magyar has increasingly demonstrated that his policy towards Ukraine will not be identical to that of most Western European liberal parties.

He is trying to balance between a pro-European course and the protection of Hungarian national interests. This is where the question of Ukrainian European integration arises. For many Hungarian politicians, regardless of party affiliation, the far-fetched topic of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia remains important. Although, after coming to power, Magyar seems to be trying to continue Orban’s policy towards Ukrainian Transcarpathia, also speculating on the issue of Ukraine’s accession to the European Union.

But if Magyar’s current actions are not only dictated by a desire to please the Kremlin, then it is likely that he is also trying to avoid a situation in which Orban can present himself as the sole defender of Hungarian state priorities.

If Magyar takes an excessively pro-Ukrainian position, he risks losing some of the voters who, although very disappointed with the Orban government, are not ready to support a politician who can be accused of neglecting Hungary’s interests.

Peter Magyar’s political career was built on sharp criticism of Orban’s corruption system and on the promise to restore trust between Budapest and Brussels. That is why Magyar’s first foreign policy steps were aimed at deepening relations with the European Union, rather than demonstrative rapprochement with Russia. But at the same time, he openly ignores the possibility of improving relations between Budapest and Kyiv.

Peter Magyar is maneuvering politically, and energy may become the critical area in which he will be forced to make attempts to build his relations with Moscow. And here the political logic may turn out to be much more pragmatic.

Regardless of who is in power in Budapest, Hungary will still remain dependent on Russian gas and oil. Even many governments that take a much tougher position towards the Kremlin continue to maintain certain economic contacts with Russia where this meets their national interests.

Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the current Hungarian government under Magyar will also seek to preserve profitable energy contracts. And this, in turn, may mean that Putin will not simply automatically switch with Peter Magyar to the model of relations that he had with Viktor Orban. For this, Magyar will have to constantly, as Orban did, publicly demonstrate his anti-Ukrainian position.

The Kremlin is currently in a situation where almost any politician in Europe who opposes further military support for Ukraine or calls for early negotiations on Ukraine’s surrender is seen as potentially beneficial to Russian interests. That is why Peskov’s positive comment may indicate Moscow’s desire to influence the political discourse in Hungary and its readiness for concrete agreements with Magyar.

Moscow is certainly watching Péter Magyar closely and reacting favorably to those of his statements that meet the Kremlin’s expectations. The only question is whether the new Hungarian prime minister understands that in Brussels he will not be allowed to play the game of «both yours and ours», as Viktor Orbán has managed to do for so long. Any attempts to recreate the model of Orbán’s relations with Putin will simply not work now.

And if we assume that Peter Magyar will try to form his own version of Hungarian pragmatism: to remain deeply integrated into the European Union, establishing partnerships with Moscow and entering into an open confrontation with Ukraine, then such a strategy will inevitably turn him into the ideological successor of Viktor Orbán and will lead to an internal political split in Hungary and severe isolation within the European Union.

Because any attempts to copy Viktor Orbán’s «pragmatism» will destroy the main uniqueness of Magyar as a European reformer and liberal Euro-optimist.

Instead of the expected subjectivity, Budapest will receive the status of a toxic partner in the European Union, whose right to vote will be constantly under the threat of restriction. And Hungary itself will turn into a tool in the Kremlin’s geopolitical game, losing the trust of Western allies without receiving real security guarantees from the East.

After all, anti-Ukrainianism and pro-Moscow orientation are equally destructive vectors that threaten the long-term political viability of Peter Magyar and can block his potential as a national leader.

For a new generation of European politicians who position themselves as an alternative to the former corrupt government, copying Viktor Orbán’s rhetoric on Ukraine or flirting with the Kremlin is a major strategic mistake.

In Hungary’s domestic political arena, Magyar has built his political capital on society’s fatigue with corruption, nepotism, and the country’s international isolation. If he chooses the path of open anti-Ukrainianism, this will deprive him of the support of the pro-European, urban, and educated electorate that seeks Hungary’s return to constructive dialogue within the European Union and NATO.

Moreover, a radical anti-Ukrainian position will not bring him new votes in the future, since this electoral field is already completely monopolized by Orbán’s right-wing radicals. And the demonstration of pro-Moscow sympathies will finally destroy the trust in Magyar from Western partners, without whose approval it is impossible to imagine the full integration of the current Hungarian government into the EU structures.

In the current geopolitical context, any hint of loyalty to Moscow is perceived in Brussels as a direct threat to collective security. For a leader who seeks to restore Budapest’s authority, the toxic trail of ties with Russia will mean immediate marginalization at the international level.

Thus: balancing between these two radical positions will not allow Magyar to form the image of a mature, predictable and hand-shaking statesman.

Now, Péter Magyar’s political future directly depends on the ability to offer a pragmatic, centrist course that completely distances itself from the aggressive rhetoric of the past and is based on respect for international law and Euro-Atlantic solidarity.